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Introduction
The September 11 th attacks on the United States by non-state actors, the
prospect of an upgraded war with Iraq, and the Bush doctrine claiming the
propriety of "preemptive" attacks on terrorists and states that harbor or
support them, as well as on states that might someday use weapons of
mass destruction against the United States and its nationals or against U.S.
allies each raise questions concerning the permissibility of the use of
armed force against terrorists and others in Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond.
Are any such uses of armed force permissible under international law?
Does the President have authority under the United States Constitution to
engage in any uses of armed force against non-state terrorists and states
that are permissible under international law? Must the President have the
support of Congress to upgrade the war with Iraq or to engage in preemp-
tive strikes against other states? These and related issues form the primary
focus of this Article.
I. Self-Defense against Non-State Terrorist Attacks
The use of military force by the United States in Afghanistan on October 7,
2001 against Mr. bin Laden and members of his al Qaeda network was
permissible under both international and U.S. constitutional law. Bin
Laden and several of his followers were non-state actors who ordered, per-
petrated, or were complicit in continuous terroristic attacks on the United
States, including the September 11th attacks on U.S. soil and previous
armed attacks against the U.S.S. Cole, U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, and other U.S. military and nationals abroad. Such ongoing
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processes of armed attack justify use of selective and proportionate armed
force in self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (the
Charter).
Article 51 of the Charter recognizes "the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs."' Although there is wide-
spread agreement that an "armed attack" must occur, 2 nothing in the lan-
guage of Article 51 requires that such an armed attack be carried out by
another state, nation, or belligerent, as opposed to armed attacks by vari-
ous other non-state actors; and several textwriters recognize that attacks by
non-state actors can trigger the right of self-defense under the Charter.3
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
2. See, e.g., Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, para. 195 (June 27); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL &
SEAN D. MURPHY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 325 (3d ed. 2002); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 150 (1991); Michael Byers, Terrorism, The Use of
Force and International Law After 11 September, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 401, 410-11
(2002); Mark A. Drumbl, Judging the 11 September Terrorist Attack, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 323,
329-30 (2002); Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing
of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 540-43 (1999); Sean D. Murphy,
Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed Attack" in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV.
INT'L LJ. 41, 42, 44 (2002); Sreenivasa Rao Pemmaraju, International Organizations and
Use of Force, in 2 LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 1575, 1578-79 (Nisuke Ando et
al. eds., 2002). All that is required is that a process of armed attack has begun, not, for
example, that the bullets have been fired or have even hit their mark. Responsive force
will be in self-defense, not anticipatory or preemptive self-defense. See infra note 15. A
series of armed attacks can constitute an ongoing process of armed attack. See infra
note 9.
An interesting issue is whether an attack using merely the release of bacteriological or
biological materials, as opposed to delivery of such materials on a missile or bomb in a
city, leading to deaths, injury and suffering on a large scale, is covered by the phrase
"armed attack." Technically, the answer would appear to be "no," and there seems to be
a need to amend Article 51 of the U.N. Charter to allow proportionate military action to
defend against such processes of attack. Use of the word "armed" in Article 51 is quite
different than use of the broader phrase "force" in Article 2 (4) of the Charter, yet states
and textwriters still debate whether economic coercion of a similar intensity, with simi-
lar consequences, to armed force is proscribed under Article 2 (4). See, e.g., JORDAN J.
PAUST, JOAN M. FITZPATRICK & JON M. VAN DYKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN
THE U.S. 80, 891, 906-07 (2000). This demonstrates that use of the more limiting word
"armed" in Article 51 was intentional at the time of formation of the Charter and would
not cover all sorts of force or weapons, and that such a limiting interpretation of the
wora "armed" would find support today in general patterns of expectation about what is
legally appropriate or required, e.g., in opiniojuris relevant to the meaning of Article 51
as well as relevant customary international law. Yet, one can also envision the develop-
ment where patterns of legal expectation change soon after significant use of bacterio-
logic or biologic weapons to attack a country and there is a responsive use of military
force by the country experiencing such an attack. Even if the meaning of the word
"armed" can thus be amended, it may be more rational and policy-serving for states to
agree on a formal amendment to the Charter.
3. See, e.g., BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 2, at 325; Thomas M. Franck, Edi-
torial Comment, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 839, 840
(2001); Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L LJ. 23, 28 (2002);
Murphy, supra note 2, at 50; Jordan J. Paust, Address, Responding Lawfully to Interna-
tional Terrorism: The Use of Force Abroad, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 711, 723 (1986); Robert F.
Turner, Legal Responses to International Terrorism: Constitutional Constraints on Presiden-
tial Power, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 77, 87, 89-90 (1999); Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to
Terrorism: The Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 559, 564 (1999); see also Tom
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Recent U.N. Security Council4 (Security Council) and NATO 5 recognitions
that the bin Laden - al Qaeda September 11th attacks implicated, rights of
individual and collective self-defense provide even more authoritative sup-
port for this point. Additionally, a famous historic case often mentioned
concerning interpretation of Article 51, the 1837 Caroline incident,
involved armed attacks against Canada by insurgent groups based partly in
the United States and recognition of the right to use necessary, selective
and proportionate military force in self-defense in response to non-state
actor attacks.6
In 1998, the United States claimed the right to use selective military
force in Afghanistan and the Sudan in self-defense with respect to various
continuing attacks by bin Laden and his non-state entourage, 7 and the
United States made a similar claim with respect to its use of armed force in
J. Farer, Editorial Comment, Beyond the Charter Frame: Unilateralism or Condominium?,
96 AM. J. INT'L L., 359, 359 (2002); but see Antonio Cassese, The International Commu-
nity's "Legal" Response to Terrorism, 38 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 589, 596-97 (1989).
The use of selective military force in self-defense against such non-state actor attacks
does not create a state of war, nor do the attacks perpetrated by such non-state actors.
For example, the September 11 th attacks on the United States by bin Laden and mem-
bers of al Qaeda could not create a state of war between the United States and al Qaeda.
Bin Laden and his followers were never the leaders or members of a state, nation, or
belligerent at war with the United States prior to October 7th. However, the U.S. use of
military force on and after October 7th against the Taliban government in Afghanistan
internationalized an armed conflict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, and
the United States thereby engaged in an undeclared war or international armed conflict
in Afghanistan to which the laws of war applied. See Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Mili-
tary Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 n.16 (2001).
4. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., preamble, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
5. See, e.g., Suzanne Daley, For First Time, NATO Invokes Joint Defense Pact With
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at A17; Deborah Orin, NATO: Count on US-Joint Military
Strikes Possible, N.Y. POST, Sept. 13, 2001, at 47; Murphy, supra note 2, at 48.
6. See 2 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906) (incident in 1837);
PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 898-99; W. Michael Reisman, Interna-
tional Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 3, 42-47 (1999). Some have
argued that the exchange of views concerning the Caroline incident addressed and justi-
fied preemptive self-defense (before an armed attack occurs) but the incident involved a
process of continual attacks on the government of Canada by insurgents operating in
Canada and the United States. Lord Palmerston claimed that the particular act of
destroying the Caroline was an act of self-defense. Lord Ashburton, the British Special
Minister during an exchange of views with U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, also
based the justification of Canada's use of force on "the necessity of self-defense" in
response to ongoing attacks, and the United States admitted that self-defense might jus-
tify the use of force, but only in "cases in which the necessity of that self-defense is
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for delibera-
tion." 2 MOORE, DIGEST, supra; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 905, RN 3 (3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter Restatement]. Preemptive
self-defense was not addressed and would have been unacceptable to the United States.
Moreover, today Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is expressly limited to the circumstance
of an armed attack. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
7. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Inter-
national Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 161, 162-63 (1999) (United States claimed self-defense
regarding armed attacks by bin Laden and his followers); Reisman, supra note 6, at
48-49.
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Afghanistan beginning on October 7th, after the September 11th attacks.8
Such defensive uses of armed force abroad in response to ongoing
processes of attack are neither mere "preemptive" nor "reprisal" actions as
such because, despite complex or mixed sanction strategies that are often
part of a decision to use military force,9 the uses of force in 1998 and 2001
were not designed merely to preempt some independent future attack or to
retaliate against an attack that had already occurred and was entirely
complete.
With respect to merely preemptive and retaliatory attacks, it is worth
noting that only three forms of force are proscribed in Article 2 (4) of the
U.N. Charter: (1) the threat or use of force "against the territorial integrity"
of another state, (2) the threat or use of force "against . . . the political
independence of' another state, and (3) the threat or use of force "in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 10
Thus, one might argue that a selective use of military force simply to pre-
empt or retaliate against non-state terrorist attacks might not constitute a
use of armed force in violation of the first two forms of force that are pro-
scribed since selective use of armed force in such a circumstance might not
actually be force used "against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of' another state if, for example, territorial boundaries or regimes
are not changed or directly disrupted. However, some states will claim that
the mere crossing of borders by armed military personnel or cruise mis-
siles of another state for such a purpose is the use of force "against" the
territorial "integrity" of a state'1 or "against" its political "independence."
More importantly, Article 2 (4) also prohibits the use of armed force
"in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations," including the need to serve peace, security, equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, human rights and fundamental freedoms, 1 2 to
achieve justice,1 3 and to ensure that "armed force shall not be used, save in
8. See, e.g., Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations President of the Security Council (Oct. 7, 2001), U.N.
Doc. S/2001/946 (2001) (claiming armed force was used "to prevent and deter further
attacks on the United States and abroad").
9. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 3, at 729-31 (regarding U.S. claims related to use of
force against Libya in 1986); Reisman, supra note 6, at 7-8, 48. When there have been a
series of attacks over time, a state may have both a responsive and a preventative objec-
tive and still be acting in legitimate self-defense as long as it is responding to a process or
series of armed attacks within a reasonable time.
10. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; see, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Comment, 78 AM. Soc'v
INT'L L. PROC. 92, 92-93 (1984); Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal, Humanitarian
Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS
167, 177 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973); but see Murphy, supra note 2, at 42.
11. See also S.C. Res. 573, U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2615th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
573 (1985), addressed infra note 14; SCHACHTER, supra note 2, at 118; Byers, supra note
2, at 406-07 (noting "most such responses will violate the territorial integrity of a
State," but some such "uses of force have been accepted"); Pemmaraju, supra note 2, at
1591.
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
13. Id. preamble.
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the common interest".14 Theoretically, it is possible that, on balance, a
given use of armed force to preempt or retaliate against non-state terrorist
attacks will not thwart most of these purposes and, in fact, will serve the
majority of such purposes. Thus, it might be argued that such a use of
force, tested contextually and in view of various purposes recognized in the
Charter, should be permissible under Article 2 (4) of the Charter whether
or not a state has a legitimate claim of self-defense under Article 51. How-
ever, predominant trends demonstrate widespread expectation and intense
demand that the use of armed force for merely preemptive or retaliatory
purposes is inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter, is proscribed
under Article 2 (4), and is not authorized under Article 51 of the Char-
ter.15 Moreover, from a policy-oriented viewpoint, the strict limitation in
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 573, U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2615th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
573 (1985) (condemning the Israeli reprisal against the PLO Headquarters in Tunis,
Tunisia as an "act of armed aggression perpetrated by Israel against Tunisian territory in
flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and norms of
conduct"); S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg., at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/
37 (1981) (describing Israeli preemptive attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor as a "clear
violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct");
U.N. S.C. Res. 188, U.N. Doc. S/5650 (1964) (condemning "reprisals as incompatible
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations"); Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th
Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) (noting that "[sitates have a duty
to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force"); STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV,
SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (1996); ANTHONY
CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE
UN CHARTER PARADIGM 72-79, 154 (1993); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE BY STATES 257, 275-78 (1963); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND
SELF-DEFENSE 182-85, 244 (2d ed. 1994); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND
FOREIGN POLICY 141-44, 295 (2d ed. 1979); ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 200-05,
217-18 (1963); PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 165-69 (1952); SUBHAS C.
KHARE, USE OF FORCE UNDER UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 83 (1985); HANS KELSEN, THE LAW
OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 797-98
(1950); JOSEF L. KUNZ, THE CHANGING LAW OF NATIONS 571-72 (1968); 2 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 151-54 (regarding reprisals); id. at 156 (regarding anticipatory self
defense) (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952); J.N. SINGH, USE o FORCE UNDER INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 237 (1984) (stating Israeli raid on Iraqi reactor violated international law);
J.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 29, 111 (7th ed. 1972); Albrecht
Randelzhofer, Article 51, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 675-76
(Bruno Simma ed., 1994); Ian Brownlie, International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of
the United Nations Charter, 255 REC. DES CouRS 203-04 (1995); Byers, supra note 2, at
401, 401 n. 1, 410 (noting that "until 11 September, any right to pre-emptive action was
widely contested... [and] firmly rejected."); Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comment,
The Use of Force Against Terrorism and International Law, 95 Am. J. INT'L L. 835, 835-36
(2001); Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strikes Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 71 AM. J.
INT'L L. 584, 587-88 (1983); Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist
Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81 N. CAR. L.
REV. 1, 27 (2002); Farer, supra note 3, at 359-60; Michael J. Glennon, Military Action
Against Terrorists Under International Law, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 547 (2002);
Murphy, supra note 2, at 42; Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-
Defense, at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf; Paust, supra note 3, at 713,
717-19 & n.21, 723; Alain Pellet, Brief Remarks on the Unilateral Use of Force, 11 EUR. J.
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Article 51, set forth in the phrase "if an armed attack occurs" will, in many
contexts, also serve various policies at stake including peace, security,
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the need for peaceful reso-
lution of disputes, and the need to assure that force will not be used save in
the common interest, and will at least prohibit unilateral preemptive
attacks that might be made under various sorts of pretext when military
force is not strictly necessary even to serve legitimate self-defense interests.
Further, the most ludicrous of preemptive self-defense claims would aban-
don strict necessity in favor of a supposed need to attack imminent threats,
which, logically speaking, are not even actual threats. Moreover, Article 39
of the Charter appears to preclude use of preemptive armed force against
perceived threats that do not amount to an armed attack under Article 51
by requiring the Security Council to determine whether a threat exists and
what measures, if any, it chooses to authorize. 16
Measures of legitimate self-defense can include the targeting of lawful
military targets, such as the head of a non-state entity-Mr. bin Laden-or
the head of a state directly involved in ongoing processes of attack on the
United States, U.S. military, or U.S. nationals abroad and such lawful
targetings in self-defense would not be assassinations which, in times of
armed conflict, would be war crimes. 1 7 The right of self-defense also justi-
INT'L L. 385, 386 n.3, 388 (2000); Pemmaraju, supra note 2, at 1578-79, 1578 n.10
(anticipatory self-defense is impermissible); John Quigley, The Afghanistan War and Self-
Defense, VALP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (on file with author); Quincy Wright, The
Prevention of Aggression, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 514, 529 (1956); see also Judgment and Opin-
ion of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Oct. 1, 1946) (regarding Ger-
many's invasion of Denmark and Norway to preempt Allied attacks therefrom);
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, March 29, 1919 (1919)
(regarding Germany's invasions of Belgium and Luxemburg to preempt a French attack
through Belgium and Luxemburg), reprinted in PAUST, FITZPATRICK &, VAN DYKE, supra
note 2, at 874, 876-78; infra note 125; cf. Lobel, supra note 2, at 541 ("open-ended"
anticipatory self-defense is proscribed). But see BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 2,
at 327 ("matter of debate"); Louis Rene Beres, Israel, The "Peace Process," and Nuclear
Terrorism: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. LJ. 767 (1996);
Reisman, supra note 6, at 18-19; Abraham Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and National
Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89 (1989). The United States abstained with respect to U.N.
Security Council Resolution 573 in 1985, noting the "escalating force and counter-
force," "the rising spiral of violence" and Israel's "responses to [prior] terrorist attacks,"
but stated that the United States "strongly support[s] the principle that a state subjected
to continuing terrorist attacks may respond with appropriate use of force to defend
against further attacks" as "an aspect of the inherent right of self-defense recognized in
the United Nations Charter." Statement of Ambassador Vernon A. Walters, reprinted in
Reprisals, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 165, 166-67 (1986).
16. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
17. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 17, para.
31 (1956) (otherwise distinguishing selective targetings of individual soldiers or
officers); JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 501-04 (2d ed. 2000); Turner, supra note 3, at 87, 90. Such selec-
tive targetings are lawful only during permissible self-defense, military actions author-
ized by the U.N. Security Council or a regional organization, or an armed conflict to
which the laws of war apply. Moreover, they would not be terroristic targetings since
there would be no attempt to produce terror (i.e., intense fear or anxiety) in some pri-
mary target. For an objective definition of terrorism see Jordan J. Paust, An Introduction
Vol. 35
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fies the capture of bin Laden or other members of al Qaeda during a per-
missible defensive military incursion into Afghanistan, or some other
country, in order to capture and arrest those responsible for, or who
directly participate in, the ongoing attacks.' 8 Such a military mission is
especially appropriate in a territory where there is no recognized govern-
ment and an insurgent or belligerent group, like the Taliban government in
Afghanistan prior to October 7th,' 9 controls substantial territory and
either harbors bin Laden and members of al Qaeda, or is unable to stop the
attacks on the United States and its nationals by those operating in terri-
tory that it controls. This is not to say that U.S. attacks on the Taliban as
such, or attacks in the future on some other group or state, would be per-
missible if they merely harbor bin Laden or members of al Qaeda or are
aware of terrorist actions and are merely unable to control them from mis-
using their territory. In fact, occupation of the territory of a state whose
government is merely unable to control misuse of its territory has been met
with widespread international condemnation. 20 Additionally, the gather-
ing of evidence in a foreign state concerning impermissible terrorist
attacks from such a state's territory is unacceptable absent consent for
such law enforcement activities by the territorial state, 21 permissible occu-
pation of foreign state territory during an armed conflict, or appropriate
to and Commentary on Terrorism and the Law, 19 CONN. L. REV. 697, 700-05 (1987). It
appears that the targeting of members of al Qaeda in Yemen on November 4, 2002, was a
permissible, selective, proportionate measure of self-defense against ongoing processes
of armed attack and not an unlawful act of preemptive self-defense. See David Johnston
& David E. Sanger, Threats and Responses: Hunt for Suspects; Fatal Strike in Yemen Was
Based on Rules Set Out by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at A16.
18. See, e.g., PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 479; PAUST, BASSIOUNI
ET AL., supra note 17, at 500; Farer, supra note 3, at 359; Malvina Halberstam, In Defense
of the Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 736, 736 n.5 (1992);
Jordan J. Paust, After Alvarez-Machain: Abduction, Standing, Denials of Justice, and Unad-
dressed Human Rights Claims, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 551, 563-66, 574-80 (1993).
19. The Taliban government was the functioning defacto government of Afghanistan
prior to October 7th, 2001 and a few states recognized it as the de jure government,
including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The Taliban also had the status of a "belligerent"
within the meaning of the customary laws of war prior to October 7th, 2001 since it had
control of significant portions of the territory of Afghanistan, a government, a popula-
tion, and an armed force; had engaged in armed conflict with the Northern Alliance;
and had outside recognition by some states as the de jure government of Afghanistan.
Thus, it was not merely an insurgent. Concerning criteria for belligerent status see
PAUST, BAssIOUNI ET AL., supra note 17, at 809, 812-13, 815-16, 831-32, and references
cited therein. U.S. cases and international law concerning defacto or unrecognized state
status use many of the same general criteria. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,
244-45 (2d Cir. 1995).
20. See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 6, at 52 (regarding "major international condemna-
tion" of Israeli occupation of Lebanon); see also Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, Interna-
tional Law, and the Use of Military Force, 18 WIs. INT'L LJ. 145, 157 (2000) (noting that
the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly constantly criticize Israeli retalia-
tory raids).
21. See, e.g., Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, para. 202 (June 27); Corfu Channel Case (U.K.
v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 1, 34-35; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 432-433; PAUST,
FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 460-97
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authorization from the U.N. Security Council or a regional organization.2 2
II. Self-Defense against State Participants in Armed Attacks
Absent U.N. Security Council or regional organization authorization to use
military force against a state that merely harbors terrorists or is unable to
control misuse of its territory, and absent direct involvement by such a
state in a process of armed attack that triggers the right of self-defense
against the state, the use of military force against such a state would be
impermissible under the Charter. 23 Harboring terrorists, providing formal
or effective amnesty for terrorists in violation of the customary and treaty-
based duty to initiate prosecution of or to extradite terrorists, 24 otherwise
tolerating, acquiescing, encouraging, or inciting terrorists within one's bor-
ders, or providing certain other forms of assistance to terrorists can impli-
cate state responsibility and justify various political, diplomatic, economic,
and juridic sanctions in response, 25 including international claims for rep-
arations and domestic lawsuits. Yet, unless the state is organizing,
fomenting, directing, or otherwise directly participating in armed attacks
by non-state terrorists, the use of military force against the state, as
opposed to only the non-state terrorists, would be impermissible. 26 For
example, when a harboring state is not a direct participant in the armed
attack, but state responsibility otherwise exists, the state attacked by non-
state terrorists has a legitimate claim against the harboring state under
international law and an international dispute can arise. Articles 2 (2) and
22. See infra sections 111, IV.
23. See, e.g., SCHACHTER, supra note 2, at 144-46; Byers, supra note 2, at 408 ("[Not-
ing the] widely held view that terrorist attacks, in and of themselves, do not constitute
'armed attacks' justifying military responses against sovereign States. Even today, most
States would not support a rule that opened them up to attack whenever terrorists were
thought to operate within their territory."); Drumbl, supra note 2, at 330 ("the basic legal
test... is whether the state had 'effective control' over the wrongdoers"); Travalio, supra
note 20, at 152-54, 158-59, and references cited; but see Byers, supra note 2, at 409-10,
410 n.46 (assuming that a radically new customary rule has developed after September
11th allowing self-defense "against States which actively support or willingly harbour
terrorist groups who have already attacked the responding State") (emphasis added).
24. Concerning such a general obligation aut dedere aut judicare see, for example,
PAUST, BAssiOUNI ET AL., supra note 17, at 9, 132-47, 170-71. Concerning the customary
and treaty-based proscription of most forms of terrorism, see PAUST, BASSIOUNI ET AL.,
supra note 17, at 995, 1005, 1007-17.
25. See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 6, at 35-36, 54. The important point here is that
states can be responsible for a vast array of acts or omissions-denial of justice, human
rights violations, transnational pollution-and not be legally subject to military attack as
a sanctioned response; state responsibility does not simplistically justify armed force in
self-defense. See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4 (finding Albania was
responsible for certain events, but British use of force was illegal).
26. See, Lobel, supra note 2, at 541 (mere "aid" is insufficient); Paust, supra note 3, at
720-21; see also Stephen R. RatnerJus ad Bellum andJus in Bello After September 11, 96
Am. J. INT'L L. 905, 908 (2002) ("it seems clear, on the issue of state responsibility, that
none of the tests ... supports the harboring theory of the United States"); Anne-Marie
Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARv.
INT' L.J. 1, 20 (2002) (stating that "counter measures allowed could fall short of the use
of force"); text and sources noted, infra notes 30-31; but see Byers, supra note 2, at
409-10.
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33 of the Charter recognize the need to settle international disputes "by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security,
and justice, are not endangered. '2 7 An armed attack on a merely harbor-
ing state would not maximize the serving of such purposes and thus would
be impermissible.
Although questioned by some,28 the majority opinion of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States recognized that a state
that sends "'armed bands, groups, irregulars... [or others to] carry out
acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to'
(inter alia) an actual armed attack," can be engaged in an armed attack
that triggers the right of self-defense against such state.2 9 The Court
added, however, that mere knowing "assistance to rebels in the form of the
provision of weapons or logistical or other support" might involve an
impermissible use of force or intervention that can create state responsibil-
ity under international law and is thus subject to certain forms of sanction,
but would not constitute an "armed attack" for purposes of self-defense. 30
The Court's opinion demonstrates that even knowing assistance to private
terrorist groups, much less harboring, tolerating, or acquiescing, each of
which can lead to state responsibility, may not rise to the level of an armed
attack.3 1 Thus, more direct participation, such as the sending or control-
ling and directing of terrorists during an attack is required. To analogize to
27. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(2), 33; see also Lori Fisler Damrosch, Sanctions Against Per-
petrators of Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 63, 68 (1999) (noting the need to exhaust
nonforcible means); Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of
National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, arts. 1-11, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57
(Kellogg-Briand Pact) (condemning "recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies" and recognizing "that the settlement or solution of all disputes or con-
flicts... shall never be sought except by pacific means"). The Kellogg-Briand Pact was
used at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, among others, concerning
individual responsibility for crimes against peace or aggression. See Judgment and
Opinion, International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Oct. 1, 1946).
28. See Reisman, supra note 6, at 37-39.
29. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.J. 14, para. 195 (June 27).
30. Id.; see also id. para. 228 ("mere supply of funds" is not a use of force); id. para.
230 ("provision of arms" is not an armed attack). The court also recognized that even if
the U.S. participation in activities of the Contras involved "financing, organizing, train-
ing, supplying and equipping of the Contras, the selection of its military and paramili-
tary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation," the United States did not
exercise "effective control" over the military and paramilitary operations and there was
insufficient evidence that the United States "directed or enforced the perpetration of the
acts" and, thus, attacks by the Contras were not acts attributable to the United States.
Id. para. 115. In view of the Court's holding, mere financing of non-state terrorists may
not involve the hiring or directing of such individuals or groups or other conduct suffi-
cient to support a conclusion that the state is directly participating in an armed attack.
Id. para. 195. However, some forms of financing might be sufficient to qualify as direct
participation such as the hiring of non-state actors to engage in an attack. See id. Fur-
thermore, the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia has declared that
"in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support," the
state should have a "role in organizing, coordinating or planning the military actions of
the [non-state group]." See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, IT-94-1-T, para.
137 (May 7, 1997).
31. See Nicar. v. U.S.
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individual criminal responsibility, a state would have to be a joint perpetra-
tor or co-conspirator directly involved in the attacks to justify the use of
lethal force in self-defense even though some forms of criminal complicity
might permit various other sanctioned responses not involving the use of
lethal or armed force.
These recognitions make the U.S. attacks on the Taliban in 2001 and
the arrest or detention of members of the Taliban armed forces, as opposed
to bin Laden and al Qaeda, highly problematic. From what is publicly
known, the Taliban did not send bin Laden's operatives abroad to attack
the United States, control and direct bin Laden's attacks on the United
States and its nationals, knowingly finance the attacks, or otherwise
directly participate in the attacks. Prior to October 7th, the United States
publicly criticized the Taliban regime for merely harboring or otherwise
cooperating with bin Laden 32 and had not even listed the Taliban regime as
a "sponsor" of terrorism and a "safe haven" regime tolerating bin Laden's
training camps and base of operations until 1999. 33 In fact, words such as
"known links," "sponsor," and "support" can cover a number of situations
and many forms of actual sponsoring or supporting will not rise to the
level of an armed attack or direct participation in an armed attack.34 The
Taliban's provision of safe haven to bin Laden and toleration of his terrorist
training camps in areas generally controlled by the Taliban, the receipt of
32. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 7; Reisman, supra note 6, at 47-49, 55.
33. See, Damrosch, supra note 27, at 67-68, 68 n.21 (addressing Executive Order
No. 13,129, 64 FED. REG. 36,759 (1999) by which then President Clinton blocked prop-
erty and prohibited certain transactions with Afghanistan on the basis of it being a "safe
haven" for bin Laden); see also Byers, supra note 2, at 408 (quoting a claim by the United
States in a letter to the U.N. Security Council on October 7, 2001, that "the Taliban
regime... [allows] the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by [the al Qaeda]
organization as a base of operation."). At that time, the U.N. Security Council also rec-
ognized Taliban responsibility for provision of safe haven and support to bin Laden,
including the recognition that the Taliban continues "to allow him and others associated
with him to operate a network of terrorist training camps from Taliban controlled terri-
tory and to use Afghanistan as a base from which to sponsor international terrorist
operations" and its refusal to extradite him; declared that Taliban refusals to follow prior
Security Council resolutions constituted a threat to international peace and security; set
up a committee to address sanctions against the Taliban; and required all states to deny
landing rights to aircraft owned, leased, or operated by the Taliban and to freeze certain
Taliban assets, but did not authorize use of military force against the Taliban. U.N. S.C.
Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999).
34. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Ori-
ented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 87 (2002) (noting that unconfirmed evidence of
Taliban support and shielding of bin Laden existed, but the United States neither sought
extradition nor provided the Taliban with proof of bin Laden's criminal involvement
with September 11 th attacks); Charney, supra note 15, at 835-36 (noting U.S. claim to
attack "states that are associated" with terrorism was too broad and that the United
States should have gone to the Security Council with more information linking Afghani-
stan as "the source of the attack"); Murphy, supra note 2, at 46 (connections between al
Qaeda and the Taliban remain unclear and "these incidents clearly were not taken
directly by the government of one state against the United States"); Lobel, supra note 2,
at 541; Paust, supra note 3, at 722 (regarding the potentially overly broad meaning of
"support" or links). However, Professor Franck seems to assume that mere sponsoring,
supporting, or harboring by the Taliban would justify military force in self-defense
against the Taliban. See Franck, supra note 3, at 841.
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monies and military support from bin Laden for the Taliban's war against
the Northern Alliance, and even knowledge of past and continuing al
Qaeda terroristic attacks would not constitute Taliban control of, or direct
participation in, future al Qaeda attacks like the September 11th attack on
the United States so as to justify the use of military force against the
Taliban, especially in view of the International Court of Justice's Nicaragua
decision. 35 Similarly, alleged Pakistani military and other support of the
Taliban and al Qaeda in the conflict against the Northern Alliance 36 would
not have constituted direct participation by Pakistani military in al Qaeda
attacks on the United States so as to justify the use of military force against
Pakistan. Iraq's alleged intelligence contacts with, or training of, some
members of al Qaeda and post hoc haven for some members of al Qaeda is
even less support of al Qaeda attacks, and there is no known Iraqi partici-
pation in the September 11th attacks.
While in Afghanistan during a lawful effort to use selective military
force in self-defense against al Qaeda, the United States could respond
selectively and defensively to Taliban attacks on U.S. military personnel or
aircraft, but U.S. use of military force, especially through massive aerial
bombardments, was much broader in focus and effect and, at least in later
stages, designed in part to contribute to the destruction of the Taliban
regime. 3 7 Perhaps the Northern Alliance could have requested support
from the United States in an armed struggle for self-determination of the
Afghan people,38 but no such request or claim is known. Perhaps also the
Taliban attacks on U.S. military in Afghanistan had become so widespread
that use of force against the Taliban as such had become reasonably neces-
sary and proportionate, but the Bush administration informed the U.N.
Security Council at the start of the U.S. use of force on October 7th that it
intended to attack "military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghani-
stan."3 9 U.S. and British military forces proceeded to attack both al Qaeda
35. See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicara-
gua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 L.CJ. 14 (June 27).
36. See, e.g., Dexter Filkins, Taliban Foes Say Kunduz is Theirs: Northern Alliance
Forces Take Final Stronghold in North, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2001, at Al; Seymour M.
Hersh, The Getaway: Questions Surround a Secret Pakistani Airlift, NEW YORKER, Jan. 28,
2002, at 36 (noting that thousands of Pakistani military and intelligence advisers alleg-
edly supported the Taliban's war against the Northern Alliance, if not al Qaeda); Al-
Qaida may have Sneaked out with Pak Fighters, Jan. 22, 2002, at http://
news.indiainfo.com/spotlight/usstrikes/22pakis.html; see also Drumbl, supra note 2, at
350 (quoting news sources: "the Pakistani intelligence service has had... [a] 'longstand-
ing relationship with Al Qaeda... even us[ing] Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan to train
covert operatives... '').
37. See infra notes 39-40.
38. Concerning the permissibility of some forms of self-determination assistance
see PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 41-42, 460, 893-95, 918, 924-25;
Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Ban-
gladesh Experience, 11 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 1, 11-12 n.39, 18-20, n.69, 30-31 (1978); text
infra notes 67-72. The closest evidence that such a claim was made appears indirectly
by way of U.N. Security Council support of "the efforts of the Afghan people to replace
the Taliban regime." See text infra note 51.
39. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the
U.N. President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001).
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and Taliban targets.40
III. Security Council Authorizations
Another possibility is that the U.N. Security Council authorized states like
the United States to use military force in broader circumstances. U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1373 reaffirmed the Security Council's "une-
quivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks which took place in New
York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001,"41 reaf-
firmed "that such acts. . . constitute a threat to international peace and
security,"42 reaffirmed "the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense, '43 reaffirmed "the need to combat by all means, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and secur-
ity caused by terrorist acts," 44 and called upon all states to "[clooperate...
to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators
of such acts."'45 However, the resolution did not declare that all states
should "combat by all means" and "take action against" states that harbor,
support, tolerate, or fail to prevent misuse of their territory by terrorists
engaged in such terrorist attacks and the resolution is expressly limited to
"action against perpetrators."46
Furthermore, commentators disagree regarding whether Resolution
1373 authorizes the use of armed force even against perpetrators of the
terrorist attacks of September 11th.4 7 I suggest that phrases such as "com-
bat by all means" and "suppress terrorist attacks and take action against
perpetrators of such acts" are broad enough to provide an authorization to
use military force against the perpetrators and the fact that the resolution
does not contain phrases used previously in Security Council authoriza-
tions to use military force in Korea, during the Gulf War, or in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, such as "by all necessary means" as opposed to "combat by
40. See, e.g., Patrick E. Tyler, Bomb and Missile Attacks - Bin Laden Issues Threat, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at Al, B3.
41. U.N. S.C. Res. 1373, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 3(c) (emphasis added). In the past, when a Security Council resolution
has called upon states to take action, the International Court of Justice has considered
the command to be legally binding. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion No. 53, Legal Conse-
quences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.CJ. 16 (June
21).
46. See U.N. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
47. See, e.g., ASIL Insights, Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Penta-
gon, Comments and Addenda, at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm; Drumbl,
supra note 2, at 328-29 (noting "state action, practice, declarations, and commentary...
suggest that the Security Council Resolutions are being interpreted as a 'green
light'... ); Murphy, supra note 2, at 44; cf. Byers, supra note 2, at 401-02, 402 n.8, 412
(opining that the resolution does not provide authorization, but "could provide the US
with an at-least-tenable argument" that it does).
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all means" and "take action against," is not determinative.48 In any event,
although the Security Council's call upon states is relevant, but not neces-
sary,49 to the permissibility of self-defense actions against bin Laden and
al Qaeda as perpetrators of the September 11th attacks, it is not a call upon
states to "combat by all means" and "take action against" a regime like the
Taliban and it is also noticeably silent concerning any sort of Taliban
responsibility, especially whether the Taliban regime had been a direct par-
ticipant in al Qaeda attacks. More generally, it is not a call upon states to
combat and take action against states that merely harbor non-state ter-
rorists, as the Bush administration claims that Iraq has done by harboring
some members of al Qaeda after the September 11th attacks.
If the Security Council authorizes the use of force against a state that
is not directly participating in non-state terrorist attacks because that
state's acts or omissions nonetheless pose a threat to international peace
and security, such an authorization would allow U.S. use of military force
under the Charter, 50 but it is apparent that no such authorization exists
concerning the Taliban regime, and no specific authorization exists for an
upgraded "war" against Iraq because of possible contacts with, harboring
or tolerating non-state terrorists. A later resolution condemned the Taliban
regime "for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of
terrorism by the A1-Qaeda network and other terrorist groups and for pro-
viding safe haven to Usama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and others associated
with them," and even supported "efforts of the Afghan people to replace the
Taliban regime," but did not expressly authorize U.S. military force against
the Taliban as such.51
IV. Future NATO Regional Peace and Security Action
The attacks of September 11th on the United States led to unprecedented
NATO invocation 52 of a mutual defense clause in the regional North Atlan-
tic Treaty53 proclaiming:
48. See Comment by JordanJ. Paust, Security Council Authorization to Combat Terror-
ism in Afghanistan, Oct. 23, 2001, in ASIL Insights, supra note 47; Byers, supra note 2, at
402 (language differs slightly); but see Addendum by Frederic L Kirgis, Security Council
Adopts Resolution on Combating International Terrorism, Oct. 1, 2001, in ASIL Insights,
supra note 47 (arguing that such language does not justify the use of force).
49. It is not necessary because Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides an indepen-
dent basis for legitimate self-defense. See Franck, supra note 3, at 840.
50. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 39, 42, 48.
51. See U.N. S.C. Res. 1378, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (2001); Addendum by
Surya Narayan Sinha, Nov. 16, 2001, in ASIL Insights, supra note 47. Similarly, the
Security Council required Iraq "to inform the Security Council that it will not commit or
support any act of international terrorism or allow any organizations directed towards
commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally
and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism," but did not authorize use of
armed force against Iraq if it failed to comply. U.N. S.C. Res. 687, para. 32, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/687 (1991).
52. See sources cited supra note 5.
53. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, T.I.A.S. No.
1964, reproduced in JORDAN J. PAUST, JOAN M. FITZPATRICK & JON M. VAN DYKE, 2000
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[A]n armed attack against one or more [NATO members] in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently
they agree ... each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking ... such action as it
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain
the security of the North Atlantic area. 54
However, lawful use of military force in such circumstances hinges on per-
missible individual or collective self-defense under the Charter as supple-
mented by relevant customary international law.
A broader regional power concerning peace and security also exists in
NATO per terms of the U.N. Charter. For example, Article 52 of the Char-
ter recognizes the permissibility of actions by regional arrangements for
"the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for
regional action, provided that such . . . activities are consistent with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. ' 5 5 NATO is an example of
such a regional arrangement and its actions in Kosovo exemplify regional
peace and security actions that were permissible under Article 52 of the
Charter as they were consistent with the serving of peace, security, self-
determination, and human rights. 56 Moreover, such a regional compe-
tence is partly enhanced by Charter-based duties of every state to take joint
and separate action 5 7 for the universal respect for and observance of
human rights.5 8 The Genocide Convention 59 also recognizes that "to liber-
ate mankind from genocide . . .international cooperation is required"60
and sets forth the duty of State Parties "to prevent and punish" genocide.6 1
Although Article 53 of the Charter does not limit "regional action" per-
mitted in Article 52, it prohibits regional organizations from engaging in
"enforcement action under [the Security Council's] authority" without its
authorization. 6 2 Permissible regional organization actions are not always
enforcement actions under the authority of the Security Council. For
example, when the Security Council is veto-deadlocked with respect to its
ability to make decisions on enforcement actions, permissible regional mil-
itary actions under Article 52 are neither "enforcement actions" nor "under
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 29 (2000)
[hereinafter SUPPLEMENT].
54. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 53, art. 5. The phrase "as it deems necessary"
leaves discretion with each member whether to use military force. See id.
55. U.N. CHARTER art. 52 (adding "nothing in the present Charter precludes the exis-
tence of regional arrangement for dealing with regional action").
56. For a contrary opinion see Shinya Murase, The Relationship Between the UN
Charter and General International Law Regarding Non-Use of Force: The Case of NATO's
Air Campaign in the Kosovo Crisis of 1999, in 2 LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 1543,
1544-45, 1551-52 (Nisuke Ando et al. eds., 2002).
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
58. Id. art. 55(c).
59. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 278.
60. Id. preamble.
61. Id. arts. I, IV-V.
62. See U.N. CHARTER art. 53.
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the authority" of the Security Council, at least until the Security Council
can act and actually decide on measures under Chapter VII of the Charter
because when veto-deadlocked, the Security Council is unable to decide on
measures "to give effect to its decisions"6 3 or to decide on "action required
to carry out" its decisions 64 and it is unable to decide to "utilize" a regional
arrangement "for enforcement action under its authority" within the mean-
ing of Article 53.65 In view of the above, it is evident that NATO's actions
in Kosovo were permissible under Article 52 and were not impermissible
under Article 53 of the Charter.
By majority vote, the Security Council should also be able to provide
"authorization" for regional action even though, or especially because, such
action is not "enforcement action." This impliedly occurred when the
Security Council voted to defeat a draft resolution attempting to restrain
NATO authority in Kosovo. 6 6 It may also be the case that such authoriza-
tions are based in new patterns of normative expectation and "subsequent
practice," and thus provide a new or clarified meaning concerning the
Charter.
V. Self-Determination Assistance
As the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law 6 7 affirms, self-
determination assistance is also permissible under the Charter. The Decla-
ration notes: "[e]very State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action
which deprives peoples ... of their right to self-determination" 68 and "[i]n
their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of
the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to
seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles
of the Charter."'6 9 The 1984 resolution of the General Assembly concern-
ing the illegal regime in South Africa also affirmed the permissibility of
self-determination assistance while "recognizing the legitimacy of [the
struggle of the people of South Africa] to eliminate apartheid and establish
a society based on majority rule with equal participation by all the people
of South Africa..." and urged "all Governments and organizations ... to
assist the oppressed people of South Africa in their legitimate struggle for
national liberation," while also condemning "the South African racist
regime for ...persisting with the further entrenchment of apartheid, a
system declared a crime against humanity and a threat to international
63. See id. arts. 41-42.
64. See id. art. 48.
65. See id. art. 53.
66. See Belarus, India, and Russian Federation: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/1999/
328 (Mar. 26, 1999); Ruth Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM.J. INT'L L.
828, 830-31 (1999); cf. Byers, supra note 2, at 402, 402 n.6. But see Murase, supra note
56, at 1544-45; Pemmaraju, supra note 2, at 1599-1600, 1602.
67. G.A. Res. 2625 (1970), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1971), reprinted in SUPPLEMENT, supra note 53, at 20-25.
68. Id., reprinted in SUPPLEMENT at 22.
69. Id., reprinted in SUPPLEMENT at 24.
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peace and security."70 As the 1970 Declaration implicitly affirms, the ter-
ritorial integrity of states can be disrupted and changed if they are not
"conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples. '71 Various other Security Council reso-
lutions and international instruments and decisions indicate that use of
force to overthrow a foreign government and to provide self-determination
assistance to a people is not absolutely impermissible under the Charter.72
However, permissibility must rest on a relatively free will of a given people
and their request for assistance, unless there is an independent basis for
support in an authoritative Security Council or regional authorization.
VI. Constitutional Issues and War with Iraq
The United States does not use military force abroad merely to go to "war,"
although several uses of armed force, even without a declaration of war or
formal recognition of such a status can trigger a status of war, armed con-
flict or "hostilities" as well as application of the laws of war to restrain
relevant methods or means of warfare, e.g., selection of targets, selection of
weapon systems, and protection of persons. Sometimes the United States
70. G.A. Res. 39/2, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/2 (1984).
71. Id.; see Paust & Blaustein, supra note 38, at 18-19, 20 n. 69.
72. See, e.g., U.N. S.C. Res. 940 (1994) (concerning Haiti); PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN
DYKE, supra note 2, at 893-95, 918; text infra notes 73-76. U.N. Security Council Reso-
lution 688 condemned "the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of
Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas, the consequences of which
threaten international peace and security in the region" and demanded "that Iraq, as a
contribution to removing the threat to international peace and security in the region,
immediately end this repression," but the resolution did not expressly authorize the use
of force against Iraq for such violations of international law. U.N. S.C. Res. 688, paras.
1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991); cf. sources and accompanying text infra notes 77-78,
121 concerning resolutions 678 and 688. In Nicaragua v. United States, the Court stated
that even if the Nicaraguan regime was a totalitarian dictatorship, "adherence by a State
to any particular doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary international
law," confused "sovereignty" with the "State," and assumed nonsensically that a totalitar-
ian dictatorship comports with "freedom of choice." Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para.
263 (June 27). Such statements are in serious error since the right of self-determination
under the U.N. Charter is not that of a "State" or a "regime" but that of a relevant people,
and both self-determination and human rights require a domestic political process
based on the relative free will of a given people. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(2)-(3),
55, 56; Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 3, 4, 12, 31-33, 36; American
Convention on Human Rights, preamble, art. 29(c), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S. Treaty
Ser. No. 36 (1969); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XX,
O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965); Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, art. 21(3), G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948); African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art.
20(2)-(3), June 26, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; Jordan J.
Paust, Aggression Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression, Politicide and Other Crimes
Against Human Rights, 18 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 283 (1986);JordanJ. Paust, The Human
Right to Participate in Armed Revolution and Related Forms of Social Violence: Testing the
Limits of Permissibility, 32 EMORY L.J. 545 (1983); accompanying text supra notes 68-71;
sources cited supra note 38. In 1998, Congress suggested that a U.S. policy should exist
to support efforts to remove Saddam Hussein from power, but did not authorize the use
of armed force to do so. See infra note 82; but see text infra note 116.
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uses armed force as a measure of self-defense, despite the error of some
who speak loosely of reprisals, which are the prerogative of Congress. 73
The United States also uses armed force in accordance with decisions
of the Security Council to authorize enforcement actions.7 4 We are over
Iraqi territory today because of a 1990 Security Council authorization to
use force 75 and, at least initially in 1991, under a 1991 congressional
authorization to use force "pursuant to United Nations Security Council
Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation" of certain pre-
vious Security Council resolutions. 76 The 1990 resolution of the Security
Council authorizes member states "to use all necessary means," including
force, (1) "to uphold and implement" a resolution recognizing Iraqi aggres-
sion in Kuwait and demanding that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait; (2) to
uphold and implement "all subsequent relevant 77 resolutions;" and (3) "to
73. See, e.g., Paust, Responding Lawfully, supra note 3, at 718-19 n.21.
74. Specifically, the United States has used force in accordance with Articles 25, 39,
42, and 48 of the U.N. Charter.
75. See U.N. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990), reproduced in part in PAUST,
FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 920-21; see also infra notes 77-78.
76. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, H.RJ. Res. 77, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess., 105 Stat. 3 (1991), reproduced in PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 2,
at 1003-05.
77. The word "relevant" is a malleable term. One interpretation is that it means
relevant to the need for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, which has already occurred. See,
e.g., Burrus M. Carnahan, Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack: Prospects
After the Gulf War, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 524, 526 (1992); Paul Szasz, Remarks, 92 AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. PROC. 136, 139-41 (1998). Does it mean relevant with respect to other Iraqi acts
of aggression and/or Iraqi threats to peace and security in the region? See Michael Math-
eson, Remarks, 92 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 139, 141 (1998). In particular, is U.N.
Security Council Resolution 688 relevant as it addresses threats to regional peace and
security posed by Iraqi aggression against certain groups within Iraq and widespread
oppression? Apparently so. See text infra notes 116, 121-23. Moreover, U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1441 listed Resolution 688 among "relevant resolutions," deplored
Iraq's failure "to end repression of its civilian population," and recalled that Resolution
678 authorized the use of force for three identifiable purposes. U.N. S.C. Res. 1441,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002). Is U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 relevant as the
Security Council stated that it was acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, recog-
nized the "threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the
area," decided "that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or ren-
dering harmless, under international supervision," various chemical and biological
weapons and ballistic missiles, and decided "that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to
acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material," among others?
Apparently so. See U.N. S.C. Res. 687, preambular paras. Q, Y, Z, paras. 8-10, 12, 34,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991); see also text infra notes 115, 121-23. U.N. Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1441 listed Resolution 687 among "relevant resolutions," recognized "the
threat Iraq's noncompliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and long-range missiles pose to international peace and security,"
recalled that Resolution 687 "imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for ...
restoring international peace and security in the area," and decided that Iraq "remains
in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution
687 .... U.N. S.C. Res. 1441, preamble, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002). Is U.N.
Security Council Resolution 949 a relevant resolution? Apparently so, since the resolu-
tion noted "past Iraqi threats and instances of actual use of force against its neighbours"
including Kuwait; recognized "that any hostile or provocative action directed against its
neighbours by the Government of Iraq constitutes a threat to peace and security in the
region"; recognized the Council's determination "to prevent Iraq from resorting to
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restore peace and security in the area" in and around Iraq.78 It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the 1991 congressional authorization to use mil-
itary force against Iraq is far more limited than the Security Council
authorization. The congressional authorization does not contain language
authorizing use of armed force to implement "subsequent relevant resolu-
tions" or "in order to restore peace and security in the area" and is limited
by the phrase "in order to," which is tied to implementation of a limited set
of resolutions.7 9 Thus, the congressional authorization does not support
threats and intimidation of its neighbours and the United Nations"; stated that the
Council was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter; condemned "military deployments
by Iraq in the direction of the border with Kuwait"; demanded "that Iraq immediately
complete the withdrawal of all military units ... deployed to southern Iraq"; demanded
"that Iraq not again utilize its military or any other forces in a hostile or provocative
manner to threaten either its neighbours or United Nations operations in Iraq"; and
demanded "that Iraq not redeploy to the south the units referred to ... or take any other
actions to embrace its military capacity in southern Iraq." U.N. S.C. Res. 949, preamble,
paras. 1-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/949 (1994); see also text infra note 117. This would justify
U.S. participation in enforcement of no-fly zones, at least over southern Iraq. See U.N.
S.C. Res. 1441, supra, para. 8 ("Decides that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts
directed against ... any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution")
(emphasis added). Paragraph 8 impliedly recognizes the continued propriety of Member
State "action to uphold" relevant resolutions and the preamble expressly recalled the
authorization in Resolution 678 to use force for three identifiable purposes, one of
which is "to uphold and implement... all relevant resolutions .. " U.N. S.C. Res. 678.
78. See supra note 70. Was peace and security in the area restored when Iraq with-
drew from Kuwait? This was not the view of the Security Council, since it decided later
that Iraqi repression of its own people constitutes a continuing threat to international
peace and security in the area. See U.N. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991); see
also infra notes 121-23; U.N. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002). This
would seem to justify U.S. participation in enforcement of the no-fly zones over Iraqi
territory, at least under Security Council resolutions. See text infra notes 110, 116-18.
Such uses of armed force and Iraqi armed force over the years have resulted in the exis-
tence of a limited de facto war to which the laws of war applied. Additionally, did Iraqi
breaches of Security Council Resolutions 687 and 949 pose continued threats to peace
and security in the region? Apparently so. See U.N. S.C. Res. 1441, supra; text infra
notes 115-17, 119. Although Security Council Resolution 687 adopted a cease-fire in
1991, a cease-fire does not end war; it suspends hostilities. Additionally, the cease-fire
was broken several times over the years and hostilities intensified several times, includ-
ing in 1993 and 1998. See Christine Gray, After the Ceasefire: Iraq, the Security Council
and the Use of Force, 65 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 135 (1994); but see Frederic L. Kirgis, Security
Council Resoltuion 1441 on Iraq's Final Opportunity to Comply with Disarmament Obliga-
tions, Nov. 12, 2002, in ASIL Insights (Nov. 12, 2002), at http://www.asil.org/insights/
insigh92.htm (assuming that the ceasefire based on Resolution 687 has not been broken
and is still alive despite the recognition in Resolution 1441 that "the Council declared
that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolu-
tion" and that "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under
relevant resolutions, including resolution 687." U.N. S.C. Res. 1441, preamble, para. 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002)).
79. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Section 2(a), 2(b)(1),
2(c) H.RJ. Res. 77, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 105 Stat. 3 (Jan. 14, 1991), reproduced in
PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 1003-05. For authority that Congress
has the power to limit presidential use of military force or to provide limits to the con-
duct of war, see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990); Brown v.
United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110,(1814); id. at 145, 147, 149, 153-54 (Story, J.,
dissenting); Little v. Barreme (The Flying Fish), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804);
Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37,
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ongoing presidential use of armed force against Iraq or some future
upgrade of the de facto war in order to remove the Iraqi regime from power
or to destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the congres-
sional authorization is subsequent in time to the Security Council resolu-
tion and, under the last in time rule,8 0 any limitations in the 1991
congressional authorization would override the domestic legal effect of
broader authorizations in the 1990 Security Council resolution even
though the Security Council resolution remains valid under international
law. Since the President is bound faithfully to execute the law8 ' and the
more limiting 1991 congressional authorization would be the relevant pre-
vailing law, the President is bound to comply with such congressional limi-
tations concerning use of force against Iraq unless they are obviated by an
unavoidably inconsistent subsequent congressional 8 2 or Security Council
authorization.
Regardless of whether Security Council authorizations existed, the
United States used armed force in Europe in accordance with NATO autho-
rizations of regional peace and security action, e.g., in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
with additional Security Council authorization,8 3 and more recently in
40-42 (1800); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1228-31 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806)
(Paterson, J., on circuit). For additional cases and authority see JORDAN J. PAUST, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW As LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 457-59 n.54 (1996).
80. Concerning the nature and application of this rule see PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN
DYKE, supra note 2, at 182, 345-60, 368-69, 372-73, 392, 395, 845, 1007, 1022.
81. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; cases cited supra note 79.
82. The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 recommended that "[i]t should be the policy of
the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein
from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace
that regime," and granted authority to the President to provide certain types of assis-
tance to Iraqi democratic opposition groups, but expressly noted that nothing in the Act
"shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed
Forces . . .in carrying out this Act" except for provision of certain defense articles,
services, education and training. Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, §§ 3, 4, 8, Pub. L. No.
105-338, 105th Cong., 112 Stat. 3178 (1998). Previously, in 1998, Congress stated that
"the Government of Iraq is in material and unacceptable breach of its international obli-
gations" with respect to its weapons of mass destruction programs and "urged" the Presi-
dent "to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws
of the United States to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations."
Joint Resolution, Iraq Breach of International Obligations, Pub. L. 105-235, 105th Cong.,
112 Stat. 1538 (1998). However, the Joint Resolution did not expressly authorize the
use of armed force and it is not unavoidably inconsistent with limitations on the use of
armed force set forth in the 1991 congressional authorization. Further, it did not refer
to the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which Congress often does when authorizing use of
armed force, and section 1547(a) of the War Powers Resolution states that authority to
use armed force "shall not be inferred ... from any provision of law .. .unless such
provision specifically authorizes" armed force "and states that it is intended to consti-
tute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of" the War Powers Resolution.
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548. Thus, it does not appear to have obviated the 1991 legislative
limitations and to have revitalized any continuing authority for the President to use
armed force under the 1990 U.N. Security Council Resolution 678. Additionally, the
subsequent Iraq Liberation Act expressly quoted the "appropriate action" portion of the
Iraqi Breach of International Obligations resolution, but denied authorization to use
armed force against Iraq. See Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, supra §§ 2(11), 8.
83. See, e.g., U.N. S.C. Res. 844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/844 (1993); U.N. S.C. Res. 836,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (1993); U.N. S.C. Res. 816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (1993).
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Kosovo, without formal or direct Security Council authorization. 84 The
ongoing Gulf War and use of force in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are
examples of use of armed force that the United States has engaged in with-
out congressional declarations of war, and the latter two are examples of
uses of force without even congressional authorization.
From a constitutional perspective, a declaration of war is the preroga-
tive of Congress.85 We have not formally declared war against a state or set
of states as such since World War II. And, to my knowledge, there has
been no U.S. declaration of war against any entity other than a state,
although the United States has been at war with certain Indian nations and
a non-state belligerent-the Confederate States of America-during the
Civil War.8 6 All of our prior declarations of war, which are few, were con-
joined with a joint resolution or legislation.8 7 Yet, it seems possible for a
mere declaration to occur without the declaration being conjoined with a
joint resolution or act of Congress, which would have to be presented to the
President. The 1973 War Powers Resolution88 functions to grant powers to
the President-whether or not such powers otherwise exist in the President
under the Constitution-to engage in certain short, meaning 60 or 90 day,
uses of armed force and involvement in armed hostilities, 89 but it does not
operate as a sweeping declaration of war or unlimited authorization. 90
Indeed, Section 2(c) proclaims a limited purpose and policy that recog-
nizes the propriety of presidential use of force only in cases of a declara-
tion of war, specific congressional authorization, or an attack upon the
United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces and, thus,
clearly does not recognize the propriety of presidential preemptive
strikes.9 1 Additionally, with respect to the more specific issues concerning
use of military force against Iraq, subsequent limitations on the use of
armed force contained in the 1991 congressional authorization would pre-
vail over the 1973 resolution. 92 The Joint Resolution of Congress on Sep-
84. See PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 921-25
85. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 79, at 439, 441, 450 n.5.
86. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863); Conners v. United
States, 180 U.S. 271, 275 (1901) (Indians as prisoners of war); Scott v. United States, 33
Ct. Cl. 486, 486, 488, 494 (1898); Duran v. United States, 29 Ct. Cl. 107, 109 (1894);
Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L.
REV. 99, 114-16, 130-31 (1972) (addressing war crimes in both contexts).
87. See PAUST, supra note 79, at 442-43.
88. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548.
89. See id. § 1544(b) (known as Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution).
90. Whatever functional authority or grant of power to the President exists in the
War Powers Resolution, it is limited by the resolution's stated purpose and policy as well
as any other limit contained in the resolution. This is necessarily so even if the stated
purpose and policy does not adequately reflect the limits of independent presidential
powers under the Constitution.
91. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c).
92. The 1991 authorization states that it "is intended to constitute specific statutory
authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution."
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Section 2(c)(1), H.R.J. Res. 77,
102d Cong, 1st Sess., 105 Stat. 3 (1991), reproduced in PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE,
supra note 2, at 1003-05. Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution requires termina-
tion of the use of armed force after 60 days unless Congress has enacted a specific
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tember 18, 2001 concerning military force after the September 11th
attacks93 also provides sweeping but partly limited authorization to the
President,9 4 as noted below. However, none of these resolutions authorize
preemptive strikes.
Under Article II of our Constitution, the President also has a share of
the war powers as the Executive, 95 the Commander in Chief,96 and one
under the express duty to faithfully execute the law,9 7 which includes the
duty to faithfully execute treaties and customary international law98 since
they are part of federal law and supreme law of the land under the Consti-
tution.99 It is this constitutionally-based duty to enforce international law
that actually enhances presidential competence to use armed force without
congressional authorization. 10 0 For example, prior to the January 14,
1991 congressional authorization for former President Bush to use armed
force against Iraq, which was not retroactive, 10 1 the President had a duty to
faithfully execute Security Council authorizations to use force, a duty that
in such a circumstance actually enhanced presidential power to make the
choice on behalf of the United States of whether and the manner in which
to execute such authorizations. Yet, because the 1991 congressional
authorization was dated after the Security Council authorization and was
far more limited, congressional limitations were binding on the President
under the last in time rule. 10 2 With respect to U.S. use of force in and
around Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Clinton rightly claimed that a presi-
dential competence to execute Security Council and NATO authorizations
of armed force existed precisely because the President has the constitu-
tional duty to faithfully execute treaty law.10 3 The same claim was made
with respect to U.S. use of force in and around Kosovo in view of NATO
authorization. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b). Limits in the 1991 specific authorization would
thus be part of any authorized extension of force beyond 60 days. Moreover, the 1991
authorization is later in time and should prevail in case of any inconsistency with the
1973 joint resolution.
93. Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against
those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Sept. 18,
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
94. Id.
95. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
96. Id. § 2.
97. Id. § 3.
98. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 79, at 143-66.
99. See id. at 1-79.
100. See, e.g., PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 1006-08; Jordan J.
Paust, U.N. Peace and Security Powers and Related Presidential Powers, 26 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 15 (1996).
101. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Section 2(b), H.R.J. Res.
77, 102d Cong, 1st Sess., 105 Stat. 3 (1991), reproduced in PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN
DYKE, supra note 2, at 1003-05.
102. See, text and citation, supra note 80.
103. See, e.g., PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 1006-08; Paust, supra
note 79, at 23-24; Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, NATO Action in Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 522-25 (1994).
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treaty-based authorization of regional action.10 4
Today, President Bush can use military force in self-defense against
ongoing processes of armed attack while executing the U.S. right to do so
in accordance with the U.N. Charter, with or without congressional author-
ization, and whether or not there is any special Security Council authoriza-
tion of enforcement action or NATO authorization of regional action. In
addition, he has the functional delegation of power under the 1973 War
Powers Resolution to engage in certain short wars when there has been an
attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed
forces, assuming that international law is complied with and that no subse-
quent congressional limitations apply. 10 5 The 2001 congressional authori-
zation to use "all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or har-
bored such organizations or persons,"'1 6 is very broad, and it is unlimited
in at least two respects: (1) it contains no time limit with respect to those
nations, organizations, or persons actually covered, 10 7 and (2) it is not lim-
ited to use of force against those who planned, authorized, or committed
the September 11th attacks, but also extends to those who aided the Sep-
tember 11th attacks or harbored the perpetrators of the September 11th
attacks on or before September 11th.' 0 8 However, international law will
still set limits on, and might also enhance presidential power in view of the
President's constitutionally-based duty to faithfully execute international
law and the President's duty under the 2001 legislation to use merely
"appropriate" measures. 10 9 Importantly, by using the terms "aided" and
104. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, Kosovo: Air Strikes Against Serbia,
93 Am. J. INT'L L. 628, 629-35 (1999); Sean D. Murphy, Legal Regulation of the Use of
Force, Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 161, 169 (1999).
105. See supra notes 88-91.
106. See Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against
those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Section
2(a), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
107. Thus, under Section 5 (b) of the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b),
the 60-90 day limit with respect to circumstances covered in Section 4(a)(1), 50 U.S.C.
§ 1543(a)(1), has been extended and Congress was explicit in the 2001 Antiterrorism
authorization that it constituted "specific statutory authorization within the meaning of
5(b) of the War Powers Resolution." Id. § 2(b)(1).
108. Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against
those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Section
2(a), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
109. Relevant'international law is a necessary background for interpretation of con-
gressional laws. See, e.g., PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 141-42;
PAUST, supra note 79, at 6-9, 62-63, 82-83, 99-100, 103-05 n.2, 107-08 n.9. Thus,
international law conditions the meaning of the express limitation to use merely "appro-
priate" armed force. Since it would not be appropriate under international law to use
military force against a state that merely aids or harbors non-state terrorists when the
state is not a direct participant in an armed attack, absent Security Council or regional
authorization, the 2001 congressional authorization must be construed to deny such a
use of military force. Further, there must be a clear and unequivocal intent of Congress
to override relevant international law. See, e.g., PAUST, FITZPATRICK & VAN DYKE, supra
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"harbored" the 2001 congressional authorization is limited to circum-
stances on or before September 11th it is not preemptive in focus,'1 0 and it
does not authorize use of force against states that merely aid or harbor
members of al Qaeda after September 11th, as the President claims Iraq
has done. Further, it is unknown whether Iraq participated in the Septem-
ber 11th attacks at all. Thus, the 2001 congressional authorization would
not provide support for the use of force to topple the Iraqi regime or to
destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in a "preemptive" raid upgrad-
ing the de facto war with Iraq. As noted, limitations in the 1991 congres-
sional authorization of armed force against Iraq would also preclude such
an operation under the 1991 authorization despite any continuing author-
ity that exists in Security Council Resolution 678.111
Despite such limitations, as far as the U.S. Congress is concerned, all
such limitations were swept away with the new joint resolution authorizing
use of military force against Iraq that the President determines to be appro-
priate to defend the national security of the United States against the con-
tinuing threat posed by the Iraqi regime and to enforce various Security
Council resolutions concerning Iraq.1 1 2 In the joint. resolution, Congress
expressly reaffirmed the continuing vitality of Security Council Resolution
678113 and recognized that "all relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions" should be enforced.' 1 4 Thus, the Joint Resolution revitalizes
Security Council Resolution 678's full effect as U.S. domestic law in con-
trast to limitations contained in the 1991 congressional authorization.
Additionally, while addressing Security Council Resolution 678, Congress
declared that Iraq continues to threaten international peace and security in
the region by (1) developing weapons of mass destruction in violation of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 687;1 15 (2) repressing its civilian popula-
tion in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 688;116 and (3)
threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in violation
of Security Council Resolution 949.117 Thus, Congress considers Resolu-
tions 687, 688, and 949 to be relevant resolutions within the meaning of
note 2, at 142, 345-52, 359; PAUST, supra note 79, at 99, 108 n.9. There is no clear and
unequivocal intent of Congress to do so in the 2001 authorization.
110. As noted, the 1973 War Powers Resolution and the 1991 authorization are also
not preemptive in focus.
111. See text supra notes 79-81.
112. See Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Section
3(a)(1)-(2), Public Law 107-243 (Oct. 2002). The 2002 authorization contains no time
limit and thus also swept away the 60-90 day time limits contained in the 1973 War
Powers Resolution (1) as subsequent federal law, and (2) as an express specific statutory
authorization within the meaning of Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. See id.
§ 3(c)(1).
113. See id. preamble.
114. See id. § 3(a)(2).
115. See sources cited supra notes 82-83.
116. See sources cited supra notes 76, 82-83. The preamble to the Joint Resolution
noted that the 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act had stated that U.S. policy should support
efforts to remove the Iraqi regime and to promote a democratic government in Iraq.
117. See supra notes 82-83.
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Resolution 678118 and also considers Iraqi breaches of these resolutions to
pose threats to peace and security in the region within the meaning of Res-
olution 678.1L9 Thus, Security Council Resolution 678, coupled with the
2002 congressional authorization, provides legal justification for the use of
armed force against Iraq, assuming that no limits are created by a new
Security Council resolution.
Soon after the 2002 congressional resolution, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1441.120 Although the new Security Council resolu-
tion did not expressly authorize the use of armed force against Iraq, it
decided "that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obliga-
tions under relevant resolutions, ''1 2 ' and recalled "that the Council has
repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of
its continued violations of its obligations,"1 22 and, more importantly, it
referred twice to Resolution 678 and expressly reminded "that its resolu-
tion 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to
uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990)... and all relevant resolu-
tions subsequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restore peace and secur-
ity in the area." 12 3 Thus, the Security Council has expressly recognized the
continuing vitality of Resolution 678 as an authorization to use military
force for any of the three purposes expressed and it has incorporated Reso-
lution 678 by reference.
Conclusion
From both an international law and constitutional perspective, the U.S. use
of military force against al Qaeda in response to ongoing processes of
armed attack against the United States, its military vessels, its embassies
abroad, and its nationals here and abroad was permissible. However, the
118. See supra note 77.
119. See supra note 78. The preamble to the Joint Resolution addresses the need "to
restore international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region." There is no clear,
unequivocal intent of Congress to override international law. On the contrary, Congress
assumes that U.N. Security Council Resolution 678, coupled with Resolutions 687, 688
and 949, authorize use of armed force against Iraq, and the President is authorized in
the Joint Resolution to use "appropriate" force "in order to" "enforce" Security Council
resolutions.
120. U.N. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002).
121. Id. para. 1. Expressly mentioned as "relevant resolutions" (a phrase relevant to
the authorization of armed force under Resolution 678) were Resolutions 687 and 688,
and in connection with the latter, the Security Council addressed the need of the Iraqi
regime "to end repression of its civilian population." See id. preamble; supra note 77.
122. Id. para. 13.
123. Id. preamble. Resolution 1441 also impliedly recognized the continued permis-
sibility of armed "action to uphold any Council resolution" when it decided "that Iraq
shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against . . .any Member State taking
action to uphold any Council resolution." Id. para. 8. Nonetheless, Resolution 1441
decided to "afford Iraq ... a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obliga-
tions under relevant resolutions of the Council, but did not obviate continuing authori-
zations to use military force. Id. para. 2. States must act in good faith to provide Iraq a
reasonable opportunity to comply. Thus, there exist both authorizations for an
upgraded war and an opportunity for peace.
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U.S. use of military force against the Taliban in Afghanistan was highly
problematic under international law and raises serious concerns about
future use of military force against states that merely harbor or support or
have known links with non-state terrorists or other international criminals.
State responsibility for support of non-state terrorists can lead to use of
political, diplomatic, economic, and juridical sanction strategies, but does
not simplistically justify the use of military force in the absence of direct
involvement by the supporting state in a process of armed attack or per-
missible Security Council or regional authorizations to use military force.
Permissible use of military force against Iraq rests ultimately on authoriza-
tion from the Security Council.
Despite claims associated with the Bush doctrine that assumes the per-
missibility of preemptive strikes against states or groups whose weaponry
or weapons programs could pose a threat to the United States or its
allies, 1 2 4 preemptive self-defense is not permissible under the United
Nations Charter absent Security Council or appropriate regional authoriza-
tion to use armed force.' 25
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